Special National Intelligence Estimate Number 13/31-62 Short-Term Outlook and Implications for the Sino-Indian Conflict by United States. Central Intelligence Agency
g 
SNIE 13/31-62 
'tOt~TROttED DtSS 9 November 1962 
SPECIAL 
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE 
NUMBER 13/31-62 
Short-Term Outlook and Implications 
for the Sino-Indian Conflict 
Submitted by the 
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE 
Concurred in by the 
UNITED ST ATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD 
As indicated overleaf 
9 NOVEMBER 1962 
ECIJ SS I E 
E.O. 1295 , 1 c. 3.6 
N ,J 'f 3 -SZ>S-
- J ~-;;,~-1~ 
2 
~GLbED-t»SS>-Ef'IEAA-4 -
The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of 
this estimate: 
The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Depart-
ments of State, Defense, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and NSA. 
Concurring: 
Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State 
Director, Defense Intelligence Agency 
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army 
Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (Intelligence), Department of the Navy 
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF 
Director for Intelligence, Joint Staff 
Director of the National Security Agency 
Abstaining: 
The Atomic Energy Commission Representative to the USIB, and the Assistant 
Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, the subject being outside of their 
jurisdiction. 
WARNING 
This material contains information affecting the Nati al Defense of the United States 
within the meaning of the espionage aws, Title 18, SC, Secs. 793 and 794, the trans-
mission or revelation of which in any unauthorized person is prohibited. 
r SECRET ~ 
SPECIAL 
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE 
NUMBER 13/31-62 
Short-Term Outlook and Implications 
for the Sino-Indian Conflict 
ECI., SS E 






SHORT-TERM OUTLOOK AND 
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE SINO-
INDIAN CONFLICT 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
With China's recent attacks on India's northern border, the 
Sino-Indian quarrel has become a serious military struggle. 
While fighting is likely to continue, we believe the conflict will 
remain essentially confined to the disputed border areas at least 
for the near future. The conflict is already causing a change 
in India's foreign and domestic attitudes favorable to the West, 
and the USSR's prestige in India has diminished. Nevertheless, 
India is unlikely to abandon nonalignment as such, and will 
continue to look to both East and West for assistance in its vast 
economic development program. Pakistan sees any military 
strengthening of India as a threat to its security and would react 
strongly against a major Wes tern program to modernize and 
re-equip the Indian military establishment. 
.. SECrtET -
THE ESTIMATE 
I. DEVELOPMENT OF THE CRISIS 
1. Ever since the first clash between Indian and Chinese forces in 
1958, India has been devoting considerable efforts to strengthening its 
position along the entire border. Roads and trails in the Himalayas 
have been improved and expanded, air transport capacity increased, 
and growing numbers of Indian troops stationed at key locations on 
the border. Increasingly confident of its ability to deal with the situa-
tion, India, in the spring of 1962, set out to establish new forward posts 
in Ladakh behind Chinese outposts, though in Indian-claimed territory. 
While these provoked strong Chinese protests, Peiping's actions in the 
area were restrained. By mid-summer, however, Indian leaders became 
extremely concerned that they had overextended themselves, and Nehru 
openly spoke about renewed discussions with the Chinese on the border 
dispute. The outcry in India against this course was so strong, how-
ever, that he was in effect forced to abandon any practical steps toward 
negotiations. 
2. Despite their concern about possible clashes in Ladakh, Indian 
leaders felt relatively safe in strengthening India's position in the North 
East Frontier Agency (NEFA). In the discussions on the border dispute 
held between India and Communist China during 1960, Peiping had 
made it reasonably clear that it was prepared to respect-though not 
recognize-the McMahon Line.1 Indeed, China had even indicated its 
willingness to abandon its claims in NEFA if New Delhi would relinquish 
its claims in Ladakh. To strengthen its position in NEFA, India sent 
troops slightly north of the location of the McMahon Line as shown 
on all but the latest Indian maps. The Indians claimed that the true 
location of the line-which in general follows the Himalayan water-
shed-was in fact north of the position on earlier maps. They also 
asserted with more vigor their determination to expel the Chinese from 
Indian territory. 
3. Peiping resisted these deployments of Indian troops, and clashes 
of increasing severity occurred. Commencing on 20 October, the Chinese 
initiated large-scale attacks against Indian positions in NEFA and oc-
cupied substantial territory. In addition, virtually all of India's advance 
outposts in the Ladakh region of Kashmir have been overrun. Heavy 
fighting resulted in total Indian casualties of about 5,000, about half 
of whom are killed and missing. Chinese propaganda has lashed out 
at Nehru and Krishna Menon in terms usually reserved for US and 
1 The McMahon Line was the result of a British, Chinese and Tibetan convention 
in 1914, ratified by the UK and Tibet, but not by China. 
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Chinese Nationalist leaders. Despite the military reverses it has suf-
fered, New Delhi has rejected the tenns of China's cease-fire offer by 
demanding that Chinese troops must withdraw to their September posi-
tions before any talks are possible. The Chinese, for their part, have 
refused any cease-fire requiring them to evacuate the posts they have 
seized in Ladakh. 
II. DIMENSIONS OF THE CONFLICT 
4. In the immediate border areas of dispute, Communist China had 
a distinct military advantage over India.:! Chinese units held the initia-
tive and were better trained and equipped with more suitable weapons. 
In both NEF A and Ladakh they were posi tio:aed in bases on the Tibetan 
and Sinkiang plateaus with only a short ascent necessary to penetrate 
the outer Indian positions, since Chinese roads in Tibet approach to 
within a few miles of their initial attack positions. Conversely, India's 
original approaches to the border were over much more rugged terrain 
relying on a rudimentary road and trail system. Supply to a large 
proportion of Indian forces, particularly in the NEFA area, was limited 
to air drop or porter carry of several days. However, as the Chinese 
advance and the Indians retreat, Peiping's advantage lessens. The 
Indians have fallen back to positions that can be supplied by jeep 
trails or roads while the Chinese inust traverse rugged terrain and rely 
on trails for resupply. 
5. While Peiping has announced that Chjnese forces will no longer 
respect the "illegal McMahon Line/' Communist China's ultin1ate in-
tentions in the conflict are uncertain. In Ladakh, a primary Chinese 
intention is to protect the very important Tibet - Sinkiang road which 
they have built across the disputed territory. The Chinese advances 
have pushed the Indians out of virtually all Chinese-claimed areas up 
to the natural barrier of the main Karakoram Range. Further deep 
penetrations would involve the Chinese in supply and terrain p:;:oblems 
almost as difficult as those that face the Indians. In NEF A, the numbers 
of troops in combat are far larger than in Ladakh. The Chinese have 
taken the important area around Towang and inade advances in the 
Walong area, on two of the key approaches to the Assam plains. The 
Chinese may aim to occupy further areas of NEF A in order to strengthen 
their military position and perhaps to use as a bargaining counter for 
use in any future negotiations. 
6. While still desirous of limiting the conflict, the Indians are heavily 
committed to reversing the tide of battle and eventually ousting the 
Chinese from Indian-claimed territory. Present Indian strategy is to 
hold the Chinese advance through the winter while preparing for a 
counteroffensive in the spring. To this end the Indians are building 
~ See Military Annex. 
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up their forces along the entire frontier. Howev_er, strains are becomi~g 
increasingly evident on the transport net serving northeastern India, 
and there will continue to be supply problems at the front. If the 
Chinese advance continues, India's civilian leaders may feel compelled 
to reverse their decision against carrying out air attacks on Chinese 
positions and supply lines. However, New Delhi will be reluctant to do 
so because of the danger of further escalation and because of fear that 
the Chinese would bomb Indian cities in retaliation. 
Ill. THE OUTLOOK 
7. In an attempt to portray a "reasonable" attitude, the Chinese have 
called for an end to the current conflict and have proposed that both 
sides withdraw 20 kilometers from the line of control as of 7 November 
1959. As this would represent an Indian concession to the extensive 
Chinese claims in Ladakh, it is unlikely that the two sides will reach 
agreement in the near future. Unless a political settlement is reached, 
fighting will almost certainly continue in both Ladakh and NEFA as 
both sides jockey for position. While the Indians probably will try to 
regain some of their lost territory, they are unlikely to make much prog-
ress in the face of superior Chinese manpower and position. In par-
ticular, the Chinese are almost certainly determined to hold the Towang 
area, in view of its political as well as its strategic importance. If the 
Chinese renew their attacks before or during the winter they will make 
some gains, but we believe the conflict will remain confined to the 
areas of present fighting. 
8. The conflict may involve much larger numbers of troops next 
spring. The Indians will probably not attempt to advance beyond their 
own territorial claims. However, more powerful Chinese attacks are 
possible, especially in the event of a strong Indian effort to recover lost 
territory, and fighting could well spread further in NEFA and perhaps 
even to new areas of Ladakh. Any major expansion of the conflict 
might involve the territories of Bhutan and perhaps even of Sikkim. 
9. The principal limiting factor is logistics. Especially if the Chinese 
should attempt to move beyond their present territorial claims in NEFA, 
it seems unlikely that their transport system could support a force 
capable of withstanding the Indian counterattacks which could be 
brought against it. It would require massive and lengthy preparations, 
including major road-building in both Tibet and NEFA, stockpiling of 
supplies, etc., for the Chinese to initiate a serious invasion of India. 
Hence, whatever may be the long-run Chinese aspirations to dominate 
India, we believe it unlikely that Peiping will undertake an expansion 
of the present conflict beyond NEFA or attempt further significant 
advances in Ladakh. 
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IV. THE INDIAN POSITION 
1 O. The Sino-Indian conflict has had a drama tic effect on Indian 
attitudes. The setbacks at the hands of Peiping, combined with Mos-
cow's stand, have prompted Prime Minister Nehru publicly to admit 
that India has been "living in an artificial atmosphere of our own crea-
tion" ... and has been "out of touch with reality." In making the 
decision to request military aid from the West, the Indian Government 
discarded a precept which had long been one of the cornerstones of its 
nonalignment policy. While this does not mean the abandonment of 
nonalignment as such, it evidences a change favorable to the West in 
India's posture. In particular, it will strengthen the awareness in 
India of the part that a strong US position in Asia plays in the con-
tainment of Communist China. 
11. Within India, the pro-Western elements in the Congress Party 
have been strengthened, and moderate pro-Westernism is likely for some 
time at least to be an asset for an Indian politician. The influence on 
policy of the generally pro-Western Indian military will probably grow. 
Krishna Menon is probably finished as a major political force in Indian 
affairs, although he probably will continue to have some influence with 
Nehru. The moderate nationalist majority of the Communist Party 
of India has adopted a position that is in conflict not only with Peiping 
but with Moscow's position as well. The majority support of the Nehru 
government's position has infuriated the extremists in the party, and 
a formal party split could well result. 
12. The Indian effort to gear up for the difficult and costly task of 
expelling the Chinese is also likely to have adverse effects on India's 
economic development effort. Despite Nehru's brave words about India's 
determination to carry out the ambitious Third Five-Year Plan, the 
necessity of financing the war effort will force some cutbacks. If the 
Indians continue their heavy emphasis on long-range investment proj-
ects, the whole economy is likely to falter. However, giving priority to 
imports of raw materials and spare parts in order to utilize presently 
available excess industrial capacity would probably limit the adverse 
consequences to the economy. An increase of the Indian Army from 
550,000 to 800,000 men- as has been suggested- would require exten-
sive external military aid. In addition, it would also seriously hamper 
the economic development effort, even assuming economic assistance 
from both the Soviet Bloc and the West at presently projected levels. 
V. THE PAKISTANI REACTION 
13. Pakistan's reaction to the West's support of India has been a 
bitter one. The Pakistanis regard Western willingness-eagerness, in 
their eyes-to supply military equipment to India as seriously detri-
mental to Pakistan's interests. They also see it as negating the ad-
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vantage of their alliance with the US. Th:y are convinced that. I?-dia 
will not negotiate "realistically" on Kashmir under normal conditions, 
and they believe that India's present difficult position offers what may 
be the only real hope to secure an acceptable settlement there. Addi-
tionally, Pakistan sees any military strengthening of India as a threat 
to its security. Pakistan has become increasingly concerned about 
India's intransigent attitude toward its neighbors during the past year 
or so-particularly since the Goa episode. In these circumstances, 
Pakistan has been unwilling to give India any public assurances. India 
for its part, despite the Chinese threat, has failed to redeploy substan-
tial numbers of its own troops from the Pakistan border. 
14. The eventual Pakistani reaction will depend on the magnitude 
and type of the aid the West extends to India. A modest program of 
infantry weapons and transport aircraft, for example, would probably 
engender chiefly widespread grumbling. On the other hand, a massive 
program to re-equip the Indian military establishment with modern 
weapons, unless balanced by comparable aid to Pakistan and accom-
panied by Western pressure on India to achieve a Kashmir settlement, 
would impose grave strains on US-Pakistan relations. For example, 
Ayub would be unwilling to agree to any expansion of special US fa-
cilities in Pakistan, and might demand the elimination of some of them. 
VI. THE SOVIET PROBLEM 
15. The expansion of the Sino-Indian conflict has presented the USSR 
with a troublesome choice. One of the basic tenets of post-Stalin foreign 
policy has been friendship with the neutral nations. India played a 
key role in this policy, as demonstrated by Moscow's previous willingness 
to incur Chinese wrath by remaining publicly neutral in the Sino-Indian 
dispute and even supplying military transport aircraft for use against 
China. Whether by design or not, Peiping's enlargement of the fight-
ing, especially coming at the time of US-Soviet confrontation over Cuba, 
has forced Moscow, for the time being at least, reluctantly to support 
"fraternal China" over "friendly India." The immediate Soviet objec-
tive is probably the achievement of the earliest possible resolution of 
the conflict. 
16. India's reaction to the Soviet stance has been one of acute dis-
illusionment--particularly on the part of the more pro-Soviet elements. 
As a result, Soviet influence in India has diminished sharply and any 
future attempt by Moscow to rebuild its position will be dogged by the 
Indian memory of Soviet support of China in India's hour of need. 
Nevertheless, India's leaders will continue to wish to maintain their 
posture of nonalignment. They will continue to hope for Soviet Bloc 




Current Military Situation 
1. Along India's northern border lies China's Tibet Military Region 
with a total troop strength of about 103,000. These forces are organized 
into 3 infantry divisions, 9 independent infantry regiments, an artillery 
regiment, 1 cavalry regiment, and 5 border defense regiments. 
Ladakh 
2. By deploying one infantry regiment, a cavalry regiment, and border 
defense forces against elements of one Indian brigade, the Chinese suc-
ceeded in reducing Indian Army outposts and securing uncontested 
control of all their claimed Ladakh territory. Although the Indians 
have evacuated additional outposts and :fighting continues in the 
Chushul area, Chinese forces generally have remained within the con-
fines of Chinese territorial claims. It is roughly estimated that 7,000 
Chinese initially opposed a like number of Indian troops. Reinforce-
ments have now brought the numbers to about 10,000 on each side. 
Sikkim-Bhutan Area 
3. Following reports that the Chinese were effecting a military buildup 
in the Chumbi Valley between Sikkim and Bhutan, the Indian Army 
positioned two infantry divisions in Sikkim and adjacent India. The 
Chinese reinforcement possibly involved at least one regiment of the 
infantry division based at Shigatse, south central Tibet. 
North East Frontier Agency 
4. In the North East Frontier Agency (NEFA) the Chinese launched 
three separate offensives employing a total of approximately six in-
fantry regiments. In the Towang area up to three infantry regiments 
with supporting artillery assaulted Indian defenses manned by an in-
fantry brigade. The attack penetrated approximately 11 miles inside 
the border to a point five miles east to Towang. At present one Indian 
infantry division is deployed in defensive positions in the Se La Pass 
area. 
5. In the Longju-Asafila area, one regiment overran platoon-size 
Indian border posts. This attack has progressed only a short distance 
inside the NEF A and has been blocked by possibly one Indian brigade. 
6. In the extreme eastern part of the NEFA-the Rima area-two 
Chinese infantry regiments crossed the border and advanced 15 miles 
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to threaten Walong. This Communist advance has been checked by 
an Indian infantry brigade in the vicinity of the town. In the NEFA 
area, Indian Army strength numbers some 35,000 with about 15,000 
troops committed to forward area defense against more than 20,000 
Chinese forces. 
Reinforcement Capabilities 
7. Excluding border defense regiments, which probably have been 
held back along the Sino-Nepal-Indian border and assigned primarily 
security and secondarily reserve "infantry" roles, uncommitted and 
immediately available Chinese forces in central and eastern Tibet con-
sist of the equivalent of two infantry divisions, three infantry regiments, 
and elements of an artillery regiment. 
8. Indian Army brigade and division reinforcements have been moved 
into Ladakh, northern Uttar Pradesh, and the NEFA; other units have 
been alerted for possible movement. As far as can be determined Indian 
forces facing the Pakistani border have not been weakened. 
9. It is estimated that the Indians could reinforce the single infantry 
division presently committed in Ladakh with possibly two additional 
infantry divisions. The two infantry divisions defending in the NEFA 
could be reinforced by an additional three divisions. These reinforce-
ments would require the decision to redeploy units now positioned along 
the Indo-Pakistani borders, and would virtually deplete India's strategic 
reserve force. 
10. Meanwhile, a total of 10 infantry and 2 artillery divisions, located 
in the Sinkiang, Lanchou, Chengtu, and Kunming Military Regions, 
are available for possible movement into Tibet. Although reinforce-
ments for the northern Ladakh area could move on either the north-
west rail-highway route through Sinkiang or the motor road across 
Tibet via Lhasa, it is believed that logistic considerations would force 
the utilization of the Sinkiang route. Deployments into Tibet can 
be truck transported into Lhasa from Lanchou in northwest China and 
along the east-west highway from Yaan in western Szechwan Province. 
It is estimated that the interregional transfer of 4 infantry divisions-2 
divisions from northwest China and 2 divisions from southwest China-
would require approximately 24 to 30 days to close in the Lhasa area. 
The redeployment of 1 infantry division either from Lhasa to the Towang 
area or from Changtu in eastern Tibet to the Rima area would require 
5 days; from Lhasa westward 1 division would require about 17 days 
to reach Ladakh. 
11. Assuming that cargo requirements would pre-empt civil air trans-
port aircraft, military troop carriers operating at maximum range (550 
nautical miles-n.m.) could provide an initial lift capacity (80 percent 
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aircraft availability) of about 2,000 troops. If civil aviation were pressed 
into service, this lift capacity could be increased to 3,000 troops. It 
should be noted that when transport aircraft occupy western China 
airfields, their forward utilization will effect a corresponding reduction 
in airbase facilities available to combat aircraft. 
12. Parachute-trained troops from China's three airborne divisions 
could be employed in battalion-size operations against bridges, airfields, 
or key terrain features, but only at lower elevations. 
13. It is believed that altitude restrictions limit the use of airborne 
troop carriers to the southern route west of the Chengtu and Kunming 
airbase complexes into the NEFA and from southern Sinkiang into 
Ladakh. 
Air Operations 
14. The Chinese Communists are not likely to introduce air in support 
of their current ground operations unless Indian forces, augmented by 
substantial Western military aid, pose a major threat to their positions. 
If introduced, the Chinese will use tactical air primarily in support of 
ground forces with strikes probably restricted to Indian positions in 
the Ladakh, the NEF A, and upper Brahmaputra River valley areas of 
India. 
15. Those Chinese airfields with runways of 6,000 feet or more within 
range of the disputed areas are in two groups. The first group con-
tains 3 airfields in the region north of Nepal, Bhutan, and the NEFA. 
They are Tingri Dzong with a 12,000 foot temporary runway at 15,000 
feet altitude, Lhasa with a 13,000 foot permanent runway at 14,000 
feet altitude, and Nagchhu Dzong with a 12,000 foot temporary runway 
at 15,000 feet altitude. The other group contains two airfields in the 
region north of Jammu and Kashmir. These are Puli with a 10,000 
foot natural surfaced runway at 10,000 feet altitude and Soche with an 
8,000 foot natural surfaced runway at 4,400 feet altitude. On the basis 
of 45 jet day fighters per airfield, 225 aircraft could be accommodated. 
16. A total of 400 combined MIG-15 and MIG-17 jet day fighter 
interceptors, however, could be deployed to all of the Chinese air bases 
closest to the threatened areas of India to provide air cover to tactical 
strikes as well as air defense. Approximately 100 IL-28 jet light bombers 
and 120 TU- 2 piston attack bombers could also be deployed to adjacent 
air bases for use in close support missions. 
17. For tactical strikes, the TU-2 would be the most dependable 
aircraft. Carrying a normal 3,300 pound bomb load, these aircraft 
could operate from even those bases at altitudes up to 15,000 feet. The 
combat radius of the TU- 2 in such strikes would be approximately 400 
n.m. The slower speeds of this aircraft, including takeoff speed, would 
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enhance its viability; first, in terms of minimizing the hazards from 
dust rocks and other debris because of the inferior surfacing of Chinese 
' ' runways north of India; secondly, due to the reduced danger of tire 
blowouts in comparison with jet operations from airfields at 10,000-
15,000 feet altitudes; and thirdly, because of the increased maneuver-
ability in flying at minimum altitudes between mountain peaks where 
weather permits. 
18. Logistics, and particularly POL, however, would be the most 
serious limiting factor on such operations. Available POL storage fa-
cilities would lin1it combat operations to not more than 10 days and 
in view of the remoteness of the area and the lack of transportation 
facilities, resupply would be very difficult. Therefore, the key to sus-
tained air operations in support of Chinese Communist ground opera-
tions in the Indian border area would be the extent of logistic support 
which could be provided, particularly POL. 
19. The Indian Air Force is roughly one-quarter the size of the Chinese 
Communist Air Forces. It has operating advantages, however, which 
partially compensate for its inferior numerical strength. There are 
an adequate number of forward airfields available, and logistic and 
operating conditions would be more favorable than at the few, more 
isolated, extremely high elevation Chinese airfields previously cited. 
The Indians are likely to initiate air operations against the Chinese only 
if future Red advances prove significant. In this event, Indian strikes 
probably would be restricted to Chinese positions and supply lines in 
Indian claimed territory in the hope that Chinese retaliation could be 
contained. If the Chinese were able to resolve their extremely difficult 
logistics problems, they could overpower the Indians in a sustained 
effort involving large segments of both air forces. However, such op-
erations are not expected. So few aircraft probably would be employed 
during a given period that the Indians, especially if they were to receive 
substantial outside assistance, could hold their own for a much longer 
time than a comparison of overall strength would indicate. 
TACTICAL AIR ORDER OF BATTLE (in selected categories) 
Fighter (jet) 
Attack Bomber/Fighter Bomber 
Light Bomber (jet) . 
Medium Bomber (piston) 
" Includes naval aircraft. 











20. Regional supply bases in southern Sinkiang and in central Tibet 
are supplied from general depots located at Lanchou and Chengtu. A 
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small air transport effort supplements overland haulage. Lhasa bases 
receive their supplies by truck over two main supply routes, which 
are sufficient to satisfy the combat needs of up to 10 infantry divisions 
(standard) at Lhasa. However, variable capacities of roads radiating 
from Lhasa affect tonnages that can be delivered to the border areas. 
21. Chinese combat units in Ladakh are logistically supported from 
both the Sinkiang and Lhasa bases. The two supply routes leading 
into the Ladakh area are probably capable of handling the combat 
requirements of from 4 % infantry divisions (standard) to 6 % infantry 
divisions (light). Heavier fighting would reduce this capability to 1 % 
or 2 divisions. Supplies diverted from the Lhasa-Ladakh supply route 
support one infantry division in the Chumbi valley. 
22. Supplies of all classes can be truck transported up to the Bum 
La and Longju areas along the northern NEFA border. Here the Chinese 
can deliver the combat requirements of 2 infantry divisions (standard) 
or 3 infantry divisions (light). From the border southward into the 
Towang area Chinese logistic capabilities, stretched across rugged, 
mountainous terrain devoid of an adequate road system, are reduced 
considerably and their forces in the area are estimated to be operating 
on minimum supply requirements. By expanding the existing trail 
system into jeep tracks and later to roads of three-ton capacity the area's 
logistical capability could be increased proportionably. 
23. In the Rima area of the NEFA present road capacities are capable 
of handling the tonnage requirements for 1 standard or 1 % lightly-
equipped infantry divisions. Forward of the border, however, road ca-
pacities reduce this capability to 20-mile advance by one infantry 
regiment. 
24. Thus, it appears that the current Chinese offensives in the NEFA 
have approached estimated logistical support limits. Deeper penetra-
tions, heavier fighting , or the introduction of additional ground forces, 
would not only require the Chinese to initiate an extensive road building 
program to increase tonnage capacities, but also force them to resort 
to aerial resupply operations to supplement their overland efforts. 
25. Indian approaches into the areas of conflict also traverse especially 
difficult terrain, utilizing a road and trail system which is rudimentary 
despite recent Indian improvements. Many of the Indian forces, par-
ticularly in the NEF A, can be supplied only by porterage or airdrops. 
In addition, Indian supply routes suffer from the fact that rain and 
snowfall are much heavier than on the Chinese-held plateaus. This 
logistical disadvantage, however, has been lessened somewhat by the 
shortening of supply lines occasioned by Indian withdrawals. While 
improvements in India's air transport capacity have received high 
priority, recovery rates for airdrops to units in Ladakh and the NEFA 
during the recent campaigns have not exceeded 20 percent. 
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The Military Outlook 
26. The current Indian Army buildup in Ladakh and the NEFA will 
continue. However, a general Indian offensive against Chinese-held 
positions will require a much greater concentration of forces equipped 
with more automatic and heavy support weapons. If units presently 
facing the Pakistani borders were released for action in the threatened 
areas, the Indian Army could muster sufficient forces to press forward 
and possibly force Chinese withdrawals. This buildup, requiring several 
months to complete, could reach its zenith upon the advent of the next 
favorable period for military operations-after the spring thaws (March) 
and before the arrival of the monsoon (July). At the same time, the 
Chinese will continue to improve their military posture. Roads will be 
built, supply points restocked, and defensive positions strengthened. 
Chinese Communist Army reinforcements of up to four infantry divisions 
with supporting artillery and possibly some tanks could be introduced 
into the Tibet Military Region without overtaxing logistic support 
capabilities. Reinforcements could be held in staging areas for rapid 
deployment to the frontier areas. This would maintain troop flexibility 
and prevent undue strain on forward supply routes. 
27. By early next summer when the Indian Army could be prepared 
to launch its offensive, the Chinese Communists could have sufficient 
forces in place to resist and successfully hold or to counterattack at 
will. If the Chinese decide to remain on the defensive, the border dis-
pute could develop into a prolonged stalemate, with expenditures in both 
men and materiel economically costly to both sides. If the Chinese 
should elect to counterattack, it is believed that they could penetrate 
deeper into Ladakh or NEFA, but it would require massive and lengthy 
preparations, including major road-building in both Tibet and NEFA, 
stockpiling of supplies, etc., for the Chinese to initiate a serious invasion 
of India. 
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